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Abstract: This research aimed to examine whether earnings management (EM) 
proxied with the practice of accrual management (AM) and real activity 
manipulations (RM) is related to the increase of firm value (FV) in the manufacturing 
industry in the IDX in the period 2010–2014. Subsequently, based on the normative 
and formal testing, the fixed effect model was selected as the appropriate model. The 
results of this empirical investigation indicate that an abnormal production cost 
(RMP) based RM practice tends to increase FV. Nevertheless, AM and abnormal 
discretionary expenses (RMD) based RM do not exhibit the same evidence. The results 
of the additional testing showed that the relationship between EM and FV differed 
when the firm was audited by an auditor affiliated with the big 4 auditors, when there 
was an institutional investor in the firm ownership and when IFRS was adopted. This 
research contributes to the literature on earnings management by suggesting that 
value creation drives the increase of FV by managers through the practices of RMP-
based earnings management. The results indicate misinformation between the 
managers and the market, which makes FV growth become a mere illusion. 
Furthermore, the proposed model is expected contribute to researchers, regulators, 
investors, and analysts in evaluating the quality of accounting numbers and predicting 
the value relevance of earnings. 
 
Keywords: Accrual Management, Real Activity Manipulations, Accounting Numbers, 
Overvaluation 
 
Intisari: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji apakah manajemen laba (EM) yang 
diproksikan dengan praktik manajemen akrual (AM) dan manipulasi aktivitas riil 
(RM) terkait dengan peningkatan nilai perusahaan (FV) dalam industri manufaktur di 
BEI di periode 2010–2014. Selanjutnya, berdasarkan pengujian normatif dan formal, 
fixed effect model dipilih sebagai model yang paling sesuai. Hasil dari investigasi 
empiris menunjukkan bahwa praktik RM berbasis abnormal production cost (RMP) 
cenderung meningkatkan FV. Namun demikian, AM dan RM berbasis abnormal 
discretionary expenses (RMD) tidak menunjukkan bukti yang sama. Hasil dari 
pengujian tambahan menunjukkan bahwa hubungan antara EM dan FV berbeda 
ketika perusahaan diaudit oleh auditor yang berafiliasi dengan auditor big 4, ketika 
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adanya investor institusional di dalam kepemilikan perusahaan, dan ketika IFRS telah 
diadopsi. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada literatur tentang manajemen laba dengan 
menunjukkan bahwa peningkatan FV didorong oleh penciptaan nilai melalui praktik 
manajemen laba berbasis RMP. Hasilnya menunjukkan mis-informasi antara manajer 
dan pasar menciptakan pertumbuhan FV hanya ilusi belaka. Selanjutnya, model yang 
diusulkan diharapkan dapat membantu peneliti, regulator, investor dan analis dalam 
mengevaluasi kualitas angka akuntansi dan memprediksi relevansi nilai atas laba 
perusahaan. 
 
Kata kunci: Manajemen Akrual, Manipulasi Aktivitas Riil, Angka Akuntansi, 
Overvaluation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Contracts are generally based on accounting numbers and unable to align the 
interests of different managers, and the drawing-up of the contracts causes the 
managers to be involved in opportunistic behaviors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
These opportunistic motivations of the managers are manifested through the earnings 
management based on bonuses received when the FV increases and even overvalued. 
Moreover, Healy (1985) presented empirical evidence that accrual management (AM) 
is related to managers’ motivation based on bonus incentives. This evidence is 
supported by the findings of Badertscher (2011), showing that the powerful incentives 
for maintaining the overvalued equity value are used by managers to improve their 
prosperity through share options or bonuses relating to firm performance. This 
condition indicates a conflict of interest between managers and stakeholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
Increasing FV is reflected in an overvalued equity value, that is when a firm’s 
share price is higher than the fundamental value (Jensen, 2005). Furthermore, Jensen 
(2005) showed that overvalue occurs when there are misinformation and manipulation 
contributed by investors, managers, analysts, securities, auditors, commercial banks 
and legal firms. This condition poses an extremely adverse consequence as the 
management tries to maintain this condition by creating values to deceive the market 
through growth illusion. Eventually, when the market detects the truth that the growth 
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is none other than an illusion, the FV will drastically plunge due to the loss of market 
trust (Badertscher, 2011; Jensen, 2005; Marciukaityte & Varma, 2008). 
On the other hand, Barton & Waymire (2004) found a relationship between 
earnings quality and overvalue that was proxied with the price to book ratio. They 
presented evidence that poor information of the fundamentals of a firm is related to 
overvalued FV. When earnings management can increase the earnings and earnings 
growth expectation, FV inflation may be resulted (Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 2000). 
Similarly, earnings management may influence FV when there is information 
asymmetry between managers and investors (Chaney & Lewis, 1995). Thus, by using 
the information asymmetry, the managers will potentially practice earnings 
management to increase FV. 
Chaney & Lewis (1995) found that earnings management practices influence FV 
(proxied with a present value of expected cash flow) when the purpose of the 
managers is to maximize value. Earnings management will result in biased accrual, 
which weakens the accrual quality (Doyle, Geand Mc Vay, 2007), indicating that the 
earnings quality is poor. Based on the investigation with a sample of 7,000 companies 
from 38 countries, Gaio & Raposo (2011) showed that the earnings quality proxied 
with accrual quality has a positive relationship with FV proxied by Tobin's Q.  
However, none of the previous studies has examined FV measured with a metric 
developed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and related it with earnings management. 
This measure had a powerful estimation ability, i.e., explaining 80–94% variance of 
FV. Therefore, this research offered a tested and robust FV predictive ability. 
Furthermore, this research presented a sensitivity analysis when the model was 
influenced by differences in the conditions of auditing quality, ownership, and IFRS 
adoption. 
This research aims to examine the relationship between earnings management and 
FV in the manufacturing sector of the Indonesia Stock Exchange. More specifically, 
this research investigates the effect of AM, RMP, and RMD on FV. The findings of 
this research show empirical evidence of the relationship between RMP and FV. 
However, the relationship between AM or RMD and FV was not identified. These 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – Jan, Vol. 21 , No.1 , 2018 
 
78 
 
results indicate that RMP practices can bring investor reactions, reflected in FV 
change/increase. Moreover, the investors did not respond positively to the AM or 
RMD practiced by the managers in the manufacturing sector in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
This research is sensitive to the firm’s environmental characteristic conditions. 
More specifically, this research presents empirical evidence that there were differences 
in the relationships between AM, RM, and FV, when the companies were audited by 
auditors affiliated with the big 4 auditors when there were institutional investors in the 
firm ownership and before and after the IFRS was adopted. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Overvaluation of Equity Hypothesis 
The source of agency problem is the involvement of managers in the earnings 
management with the purpose of producing desired earnings performance in 
maintaining firm value as shown by overvalued share prices (Jensen, 2005). This is 
the underlying assumption of this research built upon the agency theory, that is the 
overvaluation of equity hypothesis, that earnings management leads to FV increase 
(Jensen, 2005). Badertscher (2011) proved that if FV is in an overvalue condition, 
managers are driven to maintain this condition by fulfilling market expectations and 
tend to be involved in earnings management. 
Furthermore, earnings management is a way for creating values practiced by 
opportunistic managers to create an impression that the earnings performance is 
excellent (Badertscher, 2011; Jensen, 2005; Marciukaityte and Varma, 2008). Thus, 
earning management is a manifestation of value creation for attaining better FV 
condition, and it is triggered by the opportunistic behaviors of the managers upon the 
compensation to be given (e.g., bonuses or share options). This argument is supported 
by the hypothesis proposed by Jensen (2005) that managers tend to be involved in 
earnings management (AM and RM) to meet unrealistic performance expectation, 
which is reflected in the share prices that are higher than the fundamental value 
(overvalue). 
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2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1   Accrual Management (AM) and Firm Value (FV) 
AM is an approach to manipulate earnings by using available accruals. Zang 
(2012) stated that accrual-based earnings management (AM) is practiced by altering 
the accounting or estimation method used when presenting transactions in financial 
statements. 
The adverse impact of AM practices was shown by Marquardt and Wiedman 
(2004), who found that opportunistic managers in AM practices can cause damages to 
value relevance of accounting information reflected in the increased share prices. This 
finding is consistent with the argument by Jensen (2005), who stated that AM practice 
is value creation for deceiving the market and giving a growth illusion to the market. 
This is in line with the findings of Teoh, Welch, & Wong (1998), who showed that 
increased accruals are related to poor firm performance. 
Furthermore, based on the Compustat and CRSP data in the sample period 1982–
1994, Hunt, Moyer, Shevlin (2000) presented evidence that increased AM has a 
significant relationship with the market value of equity. A similar finding was 
demonstrated by Gaio and Raposo (2010), with a sample of 7,000 companies from 38 
countries in 1990–2003, who presented evidence that there is a significant, positive 
relationship between earnings quality (proxied with accrual quality) and firm value. 
This expectation can be stated in the following hypothesis: 
H1. Increased accrual management can encourage firm value (FV) increase. 
 
2.2.2  Real Activity Manipulation (RM) and Firm Value (FV) 
 Gunny (2010) explained that RM occurs when managers conduct an activity 
that can alter the timing or structurization of operation, investment and/or financing 
transaction to influence the output of the accounting system. Besides, Zang (2012) 
stated that RM is a measure aimed to modify earnings, with a consequence of less 
optimum business. Thus, RM practice is, in fact, a change of firm operational activity 
to obtain earnings. Roychowdhury (2006) stated that the RM method could be 
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implemented through sales manipulation, overproduction, and discretionary payment 
delay. 
 Gunny (2010) proposed some reasons why firms prefer RM to AM. One of 
the reasons is that RM is under the control of the managers through the decision in the 
business operation, while accounting choice or AM is limited by auditor supervision 
Gunny (2010). Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal (2005) showed robust evidence that 
managers favor real economic measures to maintain earnings performance. Their 
research showed that as an effort to meet the earnings target, 80% of the survey 
respondents reduced and/or delay discretionary expenses of research & development, 
advertising, and maintenance. Furthermore, more than half (55.3%) of the respondents 
deferred the start of a new project to meet the earnings target in spite of the 
considerable consequences for the sacrificed value. 
In line with those findings, Cohen & Zarowin (2010) explained that earnings 
management using the RM method is more common than AM method. This is due to 
the tendency of AM to attract the attention of auditors or supervision of regulators 
more than real decisions. Similarly, Kothari, Mizik, & Roychowdhury (2012) 
demonstrated that managers are more inclined to be involved in RM than AM during 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) although RM is deemed to be more costly in the long 
run. Additionally, they showed that RM practice encourages firm value increase 
(overvalue), but eventually adversely affects the market performance. 
Efendi et al., (2007) proposed that companies involved in RM tend to have high 
firm value. This finding is consistent with Badertscher (2011), who found that 
managers practice AM in the early stage of overvaluation and shift to RM to maintain 
high firm value (overvalue). Thus, managers practice RM to increase the firm value. 
Based on those findings, the following hypotheses were formulated:  
H2a.Increased abnormal production cost (RMP) based on real activity manipulation 
encourages firm value (FV) increase. 
H2b.Increased abnormal discretionary expenses (RMD) based on real activity 
manipulation encourages firm value (FV) increase. 
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Figure 1 
Empirical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Research Methods 
3.1 Population and Sampling 
The population of this research consisted of 141 firms in the manufacturing sector 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 2010–2014 (see table 
1). The selection of the manufacturing industry is of relevance to RPM measurements 
which require estimation of the cost of goods sold data. The sampling criterion was 
that the companies were in the manufacturing sector listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) in 2009–2014 due to lag-1 in the AM and RM formulae. Afterward, 
the sample was analyzed using panel data analysis as it can present more informative 
data, has high variability, has low colinearity between variables and has an adequate 
degree of freedom (Gujarati, 2004). After carrying out sampling based on balanced 
panel assumption, a sample of 104 companies per year with a period of 5 years was 
obtained. As many as 37 companies were excluded from the sample as their financial 
statement data were incomplete. 
 
 
AM (X1) 
RMP (X2) 
RMD (X3) 
FV (Y) 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Sample characteristics Number of firms 
Panel A: Description  
Manufacture firms  141 
Insufficient financial data (37) 
Final sample per year 104 
Final sample in 2010-2014 520 
  
Panel B: Composition the final sample of manufacturing firms 
1 Cement 3 
2 Ceramics, Glass, Porcelain 6 
3 Metal and Allied Product 10 
4 Chemicals 7 
5 Plastics and Packaging 9 
6 Animal Feed 3 
7 Wood Industries 2 
8 Pulp and Paper 4 
9 Machinery and Heavy Equipment 0 
10 Automotive and Components 12 
11 Textile, Garment 13 
12 Footwear 2 
13 Cable 6 
14 Electronics 0 
15 Food and Beverages 10 
16 Tobacco Manufactures 3 
17 Pharmaceuticals 8 
18 Cosmetics and Household 3 
19 Housewares 3 
Total the final sample per year 104 
Final sample in 2010-2014 520 
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3.2 Operational Definitions and Variable Measurement 
3.2.1 Firm Value (FV) 
Following the metric developed by Rhodes-Kropf et al., (2005), this research 
developed a firm value measure which was able to capture mis-valuation and growth 
opportunistic potential reflecting information asymmetry. This research used the same 
metric (Chi and Gupta, 2009; Efendi et al., 2007; Fu, Lin, and Officer, 2013; Lin, 
Chou, and Cheng, 2011; Siougle, 2007) and proved that this measure was able to 
detect misvaluation reflecting equity growth illusion. 
In the first stage, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) decomposed market to book value 
(M/B) into two components, 
𝑀 𝐵⁄ = 𝑀 𝑉⁄ 𝑥 𝑉 𝐵⁄         
 (2) 
where 𝑉𝑀⁄  reflects mis-valuation, and 𝑉 𝐵⁄  indicates growth opportunistic. 
In the second stage, equation (2) was decomposed into a logarithm form, and the 
lower-case letters in the following formula represent the logarithm values, 
(𝑚 − 𝑏) = (𝑚 − 𝑣) + (𝑣 − 𝑏)       
 (3) 
where 𝑚 is the market value, 𝑏 is the book value, and 𝑣 is the fundamental value. 
Then, in the third stage, equation (3) above was decomposed into three 
components for firm 𝑖 and year: 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ⍺𝑗𝑡) + 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ⍺𝑗𝑡) − 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ⍺𝑗) + 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ⍺𝑗) − 𝑏𝑖𝑡   
 (4) 
 
   Firm-specific- error     Industry-level error     Long-run valuation 
 
According to Rhodes-Kropf et al., (2005), in order that equation (4) above can be 
operated, 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ⍺𝑗𝑡) and 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ⍺𝑗) should be estimated and decomposed into, 
  
 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – Jan, Vol. 21 , No.1 , 2018 
 
84 
 
mit = ⍺0 jt + ⍺1 jtbit + ⍺2 jtniit
+ + ⍺3 jtI(<0)niit
+ + ⍺4 jtLEVit + εit       
 (5) 
Where mit is the log value of market value, bit is the log value of book value, niit
+ is 
the log value of net income, I(<0) equals to 1 if the net income is negative and equals 
to 0 if the net income is positive and LEVit is the leverage ratio.  
Afterward, equation (5) was applied using cross-section regression to estimate the 
firm value of every firm per year. If the market price did not reflect the true value, ln 
would be positive during overvalue and negative during undervalue. 
 
3.2.2 Accrual Management (AM) 
This research followed the metric built by Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995), 
i.e., Modified Jones Model (1991), which assumed that the change occurring in the 
current period is an object of earnings management, 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2(∆𝑅𝑡−1) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡            
 (6) 
Where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the total accrual of firm i in period t, 𝐴𝑡−1 is the total asset in period t, 
∆𝑅𝑡−1 is net in the sales change in period t, and PPEt is the property, plants, and 
equipment. Then, equation (6) was estimated with regression in a cross-sectional 
method to obtain the AM value of every firm every year. The residual value of this 
estimation captured the AM measure, which is the proxy of earnings management. 
 
3.2.3 Real Activity Manipulation (RM) 
The RM measurement followed the metric built by (Dechow, Kothari, & 
Watts, 1998) and developed by Roychowdhury (2006), which was proxied with 
abnormal production cost (RMP) and abnormal discretionary expenses (RMD). 
Previous studies used the same metric and proved that this measure was able to 
capture RM with high accuracy (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, & Lodh, 2013; Zang, 2012). 
This abnormal production cost was estimated with cross-section regression 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), 
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𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=∝0+∝1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) +∝2 (
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) +∝3 (
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) +∝4 (
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡  
 (8) 
where PRODt is the cost of goods sold (COGS) in year t and the inventory change 
from t-1 to t; At-1 is the asset total in year t-1; St is the net sales in year t and ∆Stis the 
change of net sales from year t-1 to t. Abnormal production cost was measured using 
the residual estimation of that equation. The higher the residual, the higher the amount 
of oversupply and the bigger the earnings increase by reducing the COGS. 
Then, the abnormal discretionary expenses were estimated with cross-section 
regression (Roychowdhury, 2006), 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=∝0+∝1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) +∝2 (
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡      
 (7) 
where DISXt is the discretionary expenses (i.e., the amount of R&D, advertising and 
SG&A expenses) in year t. At-1 is the asset total in year t-1. St is the net sales in year 
t-1. Abnormal discretionary expenses were measured using the residual estimation 
value from the regression. High residual value (low) shows high abnormal 
discretionary expenses (low).  
 
3.2.4 Control Variable 
This research used some control variables to control some firm characteristics 
relating to the research model. Previous empirical evidence showed that SIZE has a 
positive relationship with q-ratio, which is the proxy of firm value(Ameer, 2012). 
Another finding showed a positive relationship between SIZE and Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy for firm value (Davydov, Nikkinen, & Vähämaa, 2014). Furthermore, ROA has 
a positive relationship with the proxy price to earnings ratio of high equity value, 
which is the reflection of firm value (Houmes, Foley, & Cebula, 2013). Following 
Badertscher (2011), this study includes ROE as a control variable for controlling 
differences in firm performance. Thus, some control variables that potentially affect 
FV are included in this study. 
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3.3 Data Analysis Methods 
On a normative basis, Gujarati (2004) stated that when the sample size is small, 
i.e., fewer than 100 observations, the normality assumption plays a material role. 
However, if the size sample is relatively big, the normality assumption is negligible. 
Moreover, Gujarati (2004) stated that if the residual is distributed in an asymptotic 
manner rather than normally, OLS estimator is still normally distributed (unbiased) 
and the procedures of t-test and F-test are still applicable, and this will not apply in a 
limited or small sample. According to this assumption, this research did not employ 
the normality test as the sample size was reasonably big, i.e., 520 observations (more 
than 100 observations) and the OLS estimation remained unbiased. 
Subsequently, classical assumption tests, namely autocorrelation estimated using 
Durbin Watson (DW) and multicollinearity test using a correlation coefficient,  were 
carried out. However, heteroscedasticity test may be neglected as it is a specific 
problem in cross-section and time-series data (Gujarati, 2004). For this reason, this 
research did not conduct the heteroscedasticity test as it used panel data analysis. 
In the next stage, the Common OLS, Fixed Effect, and Random Effect models 
were implemented for testing the model specification. The model in this research is as 
follows, 
𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
 (1) 
where 𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 is overvalued metric-based firm value (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 
is abnormal production cost-based real activity manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006), 
𝑅𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡 is abnormal discretionary expenses-based real activity manipulation 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the return on asset ratio, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the return on 
equity ratio, and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of the total asset. 
Furthermore, this research used a statistical instrument eviews 8 to analyze and 
test the model better and more accurately based on the Common OLS, Fixed Effect or 
Random Effect model. The best model was tested formally using Redundant Fixed 
Effect Test and Hausman Test. 
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Common OLS estimation is an approach that neglects spatial and temporal 
dimensions. Gujarati (2004) showed that Common OLS assumes the intercept value 
and slope coefficients of all individuals as the same and assumes that Durbin-Watson 
value tends to be low or an indication of autocorrelation. This is contrary to the reality 
that every firm is unique and can be influenced by the temporal dimension and 
individuals. Therefore, Common OLS results can distort the correct or significant 
picture of the relationship between variables. 
Fixed effect model (FEM) estimation can overcome the drawback of OLS model 
by considering the difference between companies (e.g., managerial styles, working 
cultures) and time (e.g., technological changes, changes in government 
regulations/policies). The individualistic characteristics of every firm can be 
accommodated by freeing the varied or constant intercept and slope coefficients in 
every firm (Gujarati, 2004).  
Hereafter, this research took into account the condition without lag or lag-1 in the 
three models. This was aimed to anticipate the period of time in the market response to 
the impacts of AM and RM practices on the firm value. Besides, this testing could 
present useful evidence as both a leading indicator and lagging indicator. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the sample of 520 firms in the panel data regression 
are reported in table 2. The mean (median) value of variable FV showed a positive 
mark, 0.944 (0.939), which indicated that most FVs were beyond the fundamental/true 
value (overvalue). In other words, this positive value suggested that the market did not 
reflect the true value on the firm value (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Also, an AM 
means (median) value of 0.029 (0.031) reflected that the managers tended to practice 
accrual management, but some firms did not practice AM, indicated by a minimum 
value of 1.208. 
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 Table 2 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Minimum Median Maximum Std. Dev 
FV 0.944 0.838 0.939 1.166 0.042 
AM 0.029 -1.208 0.031 0.820 0.136 
RMD 9.29E-18 -0.788 0.046 0.382 0.157 
RMP -9.56E-17 -0.673 -0.052 1.455 0.234 
ROA 0.065 -0.755 0.047 0.669 0.122 
ROE 0.103 -7.684 0.107 3.246 0.573 
SIZE 14.076 9.266 13.943 19.181 1.611 
 
An RMD means (median) value of 9.29E-18 (0.046) signified that on average, the 
RMD rate was minuscule, but some managers practiced RMD, proven by a maximum 
value of 0.382. Another finding showed that a negative RMP means (media) value, -
9.56E-17 (-0.052), indicated that on average, the RMP rate was still low. Nevertheless, 
a maximum value of 1.455 showed that some managers practiced RMP. 
The mean (median) value of variable ROA was 0.065 (0.047), indicating that the 
companies included in the sample generally had a net income to total assets ratio of 
6.5%. In short, on average, the companies had positive earnings or a reasonable degree 
of profitability. On the other side, an ROE means (median) value of 0.103 (0.107) 
proved that most of the earnings performance to equity was very good, i.e., 10.3%. 
Lastly, the natural logarithm value in the mean (median) of the variable SIZE was 
14.076 (13.943). 
Table 3 showed the correlations of all variables. The highest correlation value 
was observed in the relationship between RMD and RMP, namely -0.784. This 
evidence reflected the interdependence in the managers’ decisions between RMP and 
RMD practices. In other words, RMP and RMD were not executed simultaneously; 
this also indicated the presence of substitution. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Coefficient 
 
Variables OV AM RMD RMP ROA ROE SIZE 
1. FV 1.000       
2. AM -0.017 1.000      
3. RMD -0.284*** -0.026 1.000     
4. RMP 0.367*** -0.035 -0.784*** 1.000    
5. ROA 0.254*** 0.169*** -0.326*** 0.567*** 1.000   
6. ROE 0.158*** -0.019 -0.115*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 1.000  
7. SIZE 0.181*** -0.052 0.053 0.024 0.206*** 0.091** 1.000 
 
Notes: ***ρ < 0.01 (two-tailed), **ρ  <  0.05 (two-tailed), * ρ < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
 
4.2 Appropriate Model Selection 
Table 4 of panel A showed that the probability F statistic was significant; thus 
hypothesis zero was rejected, and FEM was considered as better than Common OLS. 
Meanwhile, panel B showed that hypothesis zero was rejected. In conclusion, FEM 
was not appropriate, and FEM was used instead (Gujarati, 2004).  
Consequently, if the chi-square value in the Hausman test is significant (prob 
0.000), hypothesis zero is rejected and the FEM model is better than the REM model. 
Given this research results, further discussion is based on the FEM model. 
 
4.3 Hypothesis Testing 
Table 5 presents multiple regression analysis results from equation 1 tested using 
Common OLS, Fixed Effect (FEM) and Random Effect (REM) models. Regarding the 
selection of the appropriate model, further interpretation will be made using the FEM 
model. 
FEM model (without lag) showed that the Durbin-Watson value was 1.984, which 
indicated that the model was only slightly affected by autocorrelation as the value 
approached 2. Meanwhile, in lag-1, there was no autocorrelation, which was shown by 
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a Durbin-Watson value of 2.233. Furthermore, this research was free of the 
multicollinearity problem, which was reflected in a correlation value of below 0.8. 
 
Table 4 
Formal Test 
 
Panel A: Fixed Effect Model (FEM) vs. Common OLS  
Redundant Fixed Effect Test 
H0: FEM estimators are no better than common OLS  
H1: FEM estimators better than common OLS 
Tested Prob Conclusions 
FV, AM, RMD, RMP, ROA, ROE, SIZE 
Without lag 0.000 FEM 
Lag -1 0.000 FEM 
 
Panel B: Fixed Effect Model (FEM) vs. Random Effect Model (REM) 
Hausman Test 
H0: FEM estimators are no better than REM  
H1: FEM estimators better than REM 
Tested Prob Conclusions 
FV, AM, RMD, RMP, ROA, ROE, SIZE 
Without lag 0.000 FEM  
Lag -1 0.002 FEM  
 
 
Table 5 
Regression Analysis 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Common OLS FEM REM 
 Without lag Lag -1 Without lag Lag -1 Without lag Lag -1 
Constant 0.881*** 0.907*** 1.132*** 0.795*** 0.856*** 0.896*** 
AM -0.000 -0.021 0.005 0.006 0.004 -0.019 
RMP 0.056*** 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.020* 0.046*** 0.032** 
RMD -0.009 -0.026 0.041 0.003 -0.021 -0.035 
ROA 0.006 0.023 -0.040** -0.005 -0.004 0.021 
ROE 0.005 0.005* -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005* 
SIZE 0.004*** 0.003** -0.013* 0.011 0.006*** 0.003** 
Adj − R2 0.160 0.172 0.749 0.725 0.087 0.094 
F-Statistic 17.482*** 15.451*** 14.711*** 10.810*** 9.339*** 8.226*** 
Aic -3.620 -3.711 -4.651 -4.605   
DW 1.199 1.277 1.984 2.233 1.434 1.822 
Notes: ***ρ < 0.01 (two-tailed), **ρ  <  0.05 (two-tailed), * ρ < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Hereafter, every model was tested with time period without lag and in lag-1 in the 
independent variables. It can be seen that the level of determination showed by Adj-R² 
value for without lag (lag-1) was 0.749 (0.725) and it could be concluded that the 
independent variables could explain the dependent variable at 74.9% (72.5%) and the 
F-statistic was significant at p-value < 0.01, while the remaining was explained by 
another variable outside this model. 
Furthermore, AM and RMD coefficients were not significant, which showed that 
AM did not have any relationship with FV. Therefore, H1 and H2b were rejected. This 
evidence indicated that companies practicing AM would not improve their FVs. 
However, the findings showed empirical evidence that H2a could not be rejected and 
showed that there was a significant, positive relationship between RMP and FV. These 
results were significant both in without lag with a coefficient of 0.034 (p-value < 
0.001) and lag-1 with a coefficient of 0.020 (p-value < 0.10). These results indicated 
that the RMP variance could explain the FV variance. 
Value creation through RMP could increase optimism and expectation of FV 
growth. This result is consistent with the findings of Barton and Simko, (2002), 
Chaney and Lewis, (1995) and Jensen, (2005), who stated that RM is related to FV 
that is greater than a fundamental value (overvalue). Additionally, these results 
supported Efendi et al., (2007) and Badertscher (2011), who proved that firms with 
RM indications are more likely to have high FV. Thus, it can be concluded that 
managers who practice RM will increase the FV. 
The estimation in the control variable showed that ROA had a significant, 
negative relationship with FV in without lag condition, but insignificant in lag-1 
condition. Furthermore, there was no significant relationship between ROE and FV, 
either in without lag or lag-1 condition. These findings served as evidence that ROE 
change does not encourage change in FV. Finally, variable SIZE had a significant, 
negative relationship with FV only in without lag condition, but insignificant in lag-1 
condition. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The value creation mechanisms manifested through AM and RMD did not have 
any relationship with FV. The results of the research proved that only RMP has a 
significant relationship with FV. These findings indicated that RMP practice by 
increasing production excessively results in the decreased cost of goods sold and 
increased firm earnings. This will lead to an increase in the market expectation on the 
earnings performance reported, which is evident in the increased FV. 
Nonetheless, the market responds to the earnings performance positively as it is 
not aware that the accounting numbers have been manipulated through RMP. The 
market's optimism about the earnings performance growth resulted can meet the 
market's expectation and cause increased FV, which, in fact, is none other than the 
growth illusion. Thus, the findings of this study indicate that managers tend to be 
involved in RMP (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Kothari, Mizik, & Roychowdhury, 2012; 
Efendi et al., 2007) to improve FV (Badertscher, 2011). 
This evidence showed that the managers had successfully created value through 
RMP practice. This happened due to misinformation between the managers and the 
market, causing mis-valuation to be unavoidable, which was reflected in the FV that 
was greater than the fundamental value (overvalue). In other words, the managers only 
instilled growth illusion in the mind of the market with the purpose of maintaining the 
FV condition (which was overvalued). It is evident that the motivation of the 
managers in creating this illusion is related to bonuses for firm performance (Healy, 
1985; Jensen, 2005). 
A differing finding occurred in AM practice, which was unable to draw the 
market’s response. Zang (2012)found that managers face a stumbling block in 
practicing AM when the supervision of auditors and regulators is strict. This evidence 
indicated that the market highly trusted auditor credibility in the manufacturing sector 
on the IDX. Although managers created value through AM, the market had found out 
about the illusion and mispricing on the equity can be avoided.  
Identical evidence was found in the relationship between RMD and FV. This 
finding showed that there was no significant relationship between RMD and FV. 
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Managers technically practiced RMD by delaying the research and development, 
advertising and maintenance expenses. As a consequence, the firm sacrificed value by 
postponing a project. The market knew that the delay of a new project would lower 
future earnings performance instead. 
Moreover, the three control variables involved in the model showed that ROA and 
SIZE had a significant, negative relationship with FV. This evidence came as a 
surprise as the market tends to be attracted to a firm with the small total asset (SIZE) 
and ROA. This proved that the FV increase is not accompanied by the strong firm 
fundamentals (ROA and SIZE). On the other side, the equity performance shown 
through ROE did not affect the market decision in triggering the increase of FV. This 
evidence can be understood to be similar to the findings by Nissim (2013), who stated 
that ROE can only increase the accuracy in book value assessment.  
Overall, this research findings showed that earnings management through RMP 
method had been proven to be able to encourage firm value increase. This research 
results support the overvaluation of equity hypothesis (Jensen, 2005) that earnings 
management is considered as an integral part of the top management job and can jack 
up firm value. Also, these results are also consistent with the findings of Bruns & 
Merchant (1990) and Graham et al., (2005), who stated that managers are more often 
than not involved in RM practice in earnings management. This research supports the 
findings of Roychowdhury (2006) that managers insist on practicing RMP although 
the consequence of this action may harm the cash flow as it causes oversupply, which 
will put expense burden to the firm. 
 
4.5 Additional Analysis (Sensitivity Test) 
Daske and Gebhardt (2006) announced that IFRS adoption might minimize the 
likelihood of manager opportunism and earnings management as IFRS can reduce the 
scope of manager discretion. However, there has been much evidence of the 
relationship between IFRS and earnings management. Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) did 
not find weakened earnings management after the adoption of IFRS in Greek 
companies. Similarly, Callao and Jarne (2010), who used samples from 11 European 
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Union countries in the period 2003–2006 provided evidence that there was an increase 
in the discretionary accrual (AM) after IFRS adoption. 
Contrasting results were shown by Chen et al. (2010), who found that 
discretionary accrual (AM) as a proxy of earnings management declined after IFRS 
adoption in 15 European Union countries. Similar findings were shown by Zéghal, 
Chtourou, and Sellami (2011), who proved that IFRS adoption in a mandatory could 
minimize earning management in firms in France. The researcher interpreted these 
findings as evidence that IFRS application has differing impacts on different countries. 
Furthermore, previous studies demonstrated that the big 4 auditors restricted 
earnings management through AM (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 
1998; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Defond & Jiambalvo, 1993; Francis, Maydew, & 
Sparks, 1999). Big 4 auditors are considered to have higher auditing quality as they 
tend to be more experienced by investing mainly in resources in the auditing sector, 
and they have a better reputation for risk than smaller auditing firms. Managers found 
it harder to convince auditors of higher quality about their aggressive accounting 
practice than to persuade auditors of lower quality (Zang, 2012).  
Also, Roychowdhury (2006) showed that the higher the institutional investors' 
ownership, the lower the RM. This indicated that managers would have less flexibility 
in practicing RM when the institutional ownership in a firm is relatively high. 
Likewise, Zang (2012) stated that institutional investors are more sophisticated and 
have better information than other investors, making them more informed about the 
long-term implications of monitoring firm operational decisions. Therefore, managers 
will face a stumbling block in practicing RM when institutional investors monitor their 
operational activities. Bushee (1998) presented evidence that when there is higher 
institutional ownership in a firm, the firm will tend to reduce R&D expenses to avoid 
decreased earnings. 
The results of the dummy variable testing as a chow test alternative (see table 6) 
showed that the impacts of AM, RMP, and RMD on FV were different when the firms 
were audited by auditors affiliated with the big 4, when the institutional ownership 
was high and pra and post IFRS adoption. These differences could be caused by the 
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differences in the quality of audit, institutional investor supervision, transparency and 
accounting numbers after the adoption of IFRS. 
 
Table 6 
Sensitivity Test 
Differential 
Model 1 
AM⟶FV 
Model 2 
RMP⟶FV 
Model 3 
RMD⟶FV 
Panel A: Big 4 auditor affiliatedand non affiliated 
Differential Intercept  (⍺₂) 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.016 *** 
Differential Slope Coefficient (β₂) -0.031 0.070*** -0.082*** 
Conclusions 
Paralel regression Dissimilar 
regression  
Dissimilar 
regression  
Panel B: Institutional investorsand non institutional investors 
Differential Intercept  (⍺₂) -0.012*** -0.005 -0.006* 
Differential Slope Coefficient (β₂) 0.035 -0.090*** 0.035 
Conclusions 
Paralel regression Concurrent 
regression 
Paralel regression 
Panel C: Praandpost IFRS adoption 
Differential Intercept  (⍺₂) 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
Differential Slope Coefficient (β₂) 0.052*** 0.025* 0.033* 
Conclusions 
Dissimilar 
regression  
Dissimilar 
regression  
Dissimilar 
regression 
Notes: ***ρ < 0.01 (two-tailed), **ρ  <  0.05 (two-tailed), * ρ < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
 
 
5. Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations of Research 
5.1 Conclusion 
This study has presented an empirical investigation with a sample consisting of 
manufacturing companies listed on the IDX and proved that managers practiced 
earnings management to increase firm value in the period 2010–2014. The observed 
earnings management was proxied with AM and RM. AM was estimated using the 
Modified Jones Model (1991) that was developed by Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney 
(1995). Meanwhile, RM was estimated using abnormal production cost (RMP) and 
abnormal discretionary expenses (RMD)—models developed by Roychowdhury 
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(2006). Afterward, firm value (FV) was estimated using the measure built by (Rhodes-
Kropf et al., 2005). 
This research contributes to the literature concerning earnings management by 
showing that the increase in the value creation practice through earnings management 
plays a role in FV increase. First, the results presented empirical evidence that FV 
increases as a result of the RMP increase. The results of the additional analysis 
showed that the relationship between RMP and FV is different when the firm is 
audited by auditors affiliated with the big4, when an institutional investor is present 
and when IFRS is adopted. Second, the results showed no evidence of the relationship 
between AM as well as RMD and FV. This finding indicated that the managers 
practicing AM or RMD do not influence market response, thus unable to move FV. 
However, based on the sensitivity test results, the relationships between AM, RMD, 
and FV are different when restricted by an auditor affiliated with the big 4 auditors, 
when an institutional investor is present and when IFRS is adopted. 
 
5.2 Implications 
The empirical findings showing that RMP practice can encourage FV have an 
implication for researchers, regulators and analysts/investors. For researchers, this 
relationship indicates that the focus solely on AM or RM will not holistically explain 
earnings management activities. As for regulators, increased supervision will not 
entirely root out earnings management as managers still can create growth illusion 
through RMP. These results serve as a useful information supplement for analysts or 
investors in evaluating the quality of financial statements of manufacturing companies 
listed on the IDX. For example, these results may be helpful for decision making 
relating to share selection and credit decisions. 
 
5.3 Research Limitations and Future Research Agenda 
One of the limitations of this research is that this model is sensitive to differing 
audit quality, the presence of an institutional investor and IFRS adoption. However, 
this research only estimated the difference occurrence, rather than the relationship 
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pattern, in those varied conditions. Thus, it is expected that these findings become a 
guideline that needs to be explored for future research. 
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